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impacts in the less corrupt countries if capital account liberalization is enacted. Empir-
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1 Introduction
Many researchers have emphasized the importance of the eﬀects of government corruption
on economic growth and development from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective
(e.g., de Vaal and Ebben, 2011; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Mauro,
1995, 2004; Mo, 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).1 Corrupt oﬃcials may waste public funds,
for instance, by awarding contracts to the private agents who pay the largest bribes rather
than to those who are the most eﬃcient or by putting collected taxes directly into their
own pockets (Weil, 2008).2 The World Bank estimates that the entire economy in the world
incurs corruption costs of more than one trillion dollars a year.3
North (1990) asserts that an eﬃcient institution that ensures the secured property rights,
which derive incentives to invest or innovate, is crucial for economic growth and development.
Countries with weak institutions often do not establish the rule of law, and thus, property
rights are not secured. If property rights are not secured, economic agents lack the incentive
to invest or innovate because the return on investment or innovation could be plundered from
investors. Many researchers have produced empirical evidence to support North’s assertion
(e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1995).
Government corruption and a weak institution are often interrelated. In countries with
a poor quality legal enforcement system, government corruption is often prevalent because
corrupt government oﬃcials are not punished by the law if a country has a weak judicial
system. In turn, government corruption often causes an ineﬃcient and weak institution
because corrupt government oﬃcials have strong incentives to establish and maintain a poor
1Moreover, Wei (2000a, 2000b) has studied the eﬀects of corruption on foreign direct investment (FDI)
and has found that corruption is a significant obstacle to FDI.
2Corruption takes many forms, such as bribes to government oﬃcials from tax payers, trades of oﬃcial
contracts for cash payments, and embezzlement of public funds. The World Bank (1997, 2001) identifies the
root causes of corruption.
3See the News & Broadcast of the World Bank at http://go.worldbank.org/LJA29GHA80. According to
this article, one trillion dollars were paid worldwide in 2001-2002 as actual bribes in both rich and developing
countries. Note that this one trillion dollars does not include the embezzlement of public funds or the theft
of public assets. Daniel Kaufmann, the World Bank Institute’s director for Governance, says that “it is
important to emphasize that this is not simply a developing country problem but that fighting corruption is
a global challenge.”
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quality legal enforcement system if the gains from corruption are greater than the wages of
government oﬃcials (Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998; Becker and Stigler, 1974).
As such, it is now widely accepted that weak institutions and corruption are serious
obstacles to economic growth and development; however, how capital account liberalization
aﬀects the negative impacts of corruption (or weak institutions) on economic growth has
been unexplored. The objective of this research is to demonstrate that it is important
to investigate economic growth from the perspectives of both financial globalization and
government corruption.
The eﬀects of financial globalization on economic growth have been extensively inves-
tigated by many researchers (e.g., Chanda, 2005; Eichengreen and Leblang, 2003; Quinn,
1997; Quinn and Toyoda, 2008; Rodrik, 1998). However, it remains unclear whether finan-
cial globalization is beneficial to all countries as many pieces of mixed evidence have been
produced.4 Moreover, whether financial globalization is beneficial to countries with strong
institutions remains unclear as well. While Krray (1998), Bekaert et al. (2005), and Quinn
and Toyoda (2008) find no evidence that capital account liberalization positively aﬀects eco-
nomic growth even though a country has a high level of institutional quality, Arteta et al.
(2003), Durham (2004), and Klein (2005) find supportive evidence for its positive eﬀects,
although the result is not very robust depending upon the specifications and the sample
period. In this research, we re-examine whether capital account liberalization is beneficial
to countries with good institutions, focusing on the eﬀects of government corruption on eco-
nomic growth. In particular, we address, both empirically and theoretically, the extent to
which capital account liberalization amplifies or reduces the negative eﬀects of government
corruption on economic growth.
The theoretical part of our research is related to the work of Tornell and Velasco (1992),
who essentially demonstrate that better institutions promote capital inflow and economic
growth. While their study has focused on the role of a country’s institution in investigating
4See Kose et al. (2009, 2010) for the comprehensive survey of the literature on financial globalization.
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the interaction between financial globalization and economic growth, they have not explic-
itly emphasized the importance of government corruption. In contrast, we incorporate the
behavior of a corrupt government into our model as did Mauro (2004) and de Vaal and
Ebben (2011). Unlike Mauro (2004) and de Vaal and Ebben (2011), however, we study a
two-country model in which the two countries diﬀer in the degree of corruption.
Our theoretical findings are that if government corruption is less prevalent in a country,
capital account liberalization leads to a higher growth rate; whereas if government corrup-
tion is highly prevalent in a country, capital account liberalization leads to a lower growth
rate. These findings are novel theoretical contributions to the literature on corruption and
growth. The mechanism behind these results is as follows. In our model, if a country is
financially closed to the world market, government corruption only causes a higher tax rate
on labor income, and thus, the magnitude of government corruption on the economic growth
is relatively limited. Meanwhile, if two countries are financially integrated, the tax rate on
an investment project becomes higher in the highly corrupt country than in the less corrupt
country. Consequently, financial capital flows into a less corrupt country from a highly cor-
rupt country because the return on investment in the highly corrupt country is smaller than
in the less corrupt country. Accordingly, in the two-country setting, the negative impacts of
government corruption in the highly corrupt country are magnified, while they are reduced
in the less corrupt country.
These theoretical consequences are consistent with the existing empirical evidence, show-
ing that weak institutional circumstances in poor countries are obstacles to capital inflow
from rich countries, and they may even induce capital flight from the poor countries (e.g.,
Alfaro et al., 2008; Wei, 2000a, 2000b). Under the circumstances in which government cor-
ruption is prevalent and the rule of law is undermined, if a country opens its financial market
to the world market, it is highly likely that capital flows out of the country and economic
growth is significantly dampened more so than when the country is a closed economy.
According to standard neo-classical growth models, financial globalization generates eco-
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nomic advantages for all countries participating in the international financial market as rich
countries are given new investment opportunities in poor countries and, in turn, poor coun-
tries, where marginal product of capital is higher than in rich countries, obtain otherwise
scarce capital stock from rich countries. In reality, however, capital does not flow from rich
countries to poor countries as much as neo-classical growth models predict (Lucas, 1990; Ob-
stfeld and Taylor, 2004; Stulz, 2005). The volume of capital that moved to poor countries in
recent years is a very small proportion of the total capital flow in the international financial
market (Mishkin, 2007). In this sense, our theoretical part contributes to the literature on
the Lucas paradox.
Moreover, we empirically examine the eﬀects of government corruption on economic
growth by analyzing the panel data from 111 countries. Our empirical evidence is con-
sistent with our theoretical findings, namely, capital account liberalization is beneficial to
less corrupt countries but is disadvantageous to highly corrupt countries. Our empirical
findings are complementary to evidence reported in the existing literature on financial glob-
alization and growth (e.g., Arteta et al., 2003; Durham, 2004; Klein, 2005) and on corruption
and growth (e.g., Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we develop a model
to explain how the magnitude of government corruption is amplified in the case of an open
economy relative to that of a closed economy. In section 3, we derive equilibrium growth
rates both in the case of the closed economy and in the case of the open economy. Section 4
discusses the mechanism through which the eﬀects of government corruption on growth-rate
diﬀerences are magnified in the two-country setting compared with the closed economy case.
In section 5, we provide empirical evidence for our theoretical findings. Section 6 presents
concluding remarks.
5
2 Model
An economy consists of the government, an infinitely-lived representative firm, and overlap-
ping generations. Each individual in a generation lives for two periods, meaning that young
and old agents always coexist in each period. Time is discrete, expanding from 0 to ∞.
Each individual born at time t exclusively obtains the utility from his/her second-period
consumption ct+1. As there is no uncertainty in our economy, without loss of generality, we
can assume that the utility function is linear with respect to his/her second-period consump-
tion, that is, u(ct+1) := ct+1. The population of each generation is constant over time. The
timing of events from time t to time t+ 1 is described as follows.
• Individuals are born at the beginning of time t.
• Production at time t occurs and individuals earn wages. The government collects
corporate tax from the representative firm.
• Individuals make decisions on how much they invest, borrow, and/or lend.
• At the end of time t, the government makes decisions on corruption and the corporate
tax rate imposed on the production of the representative firm for time t+ 1.
• Production at time t + 1 occurs and the government collects corporate tax from the
representative firm. Individuals receive the return on investment and lending. They
repay their obligations if they borrowed at time t. Individuals consume all their income.
As will be addressed later, the choice variables of the government are a misappropriation
share of public funds and the corporate tax rate. We assume that a certain proportion of pri-
vate individuals have close relationships with the government, and these private individuals
misappropriate public funds through their abuses.5 In this sense, the government is sub-
benevolent because the government decisions are biased toward those individuals colluding
5In this paper, the ratio of corrupt individuals to all individuals does not matter. What matters is that
there are those individuals who have close relationships with the government.
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with the government. Without collusion, the government would choose the corporate tax
so as to maximize per capita consumption in the economy. Note that because the collective
decisions of the government are made at the end of time t, neither old agents at time t
nor young agents at time t + 1 are involved in the political process of the decision making
regarding time t+ 1. The government commits to its decisions made at the end of time t in
conducting its policy at time t+ 1.
In this economy, there are three kinds of capital. The first is real capital, which is supplied
by individuals in an economy. The real capital is broadly thought of as a combination of
physical capital and human capital. The real capital is country-specific, implying that it
is not tradable between countries. The second is public capital, which is supplied by the
government. One may think that public capital forms an infrastructure in the economy,
which positively aﬀects the final production of the economy. Both the real capital and
the public capital depreciate entirely in one period. The third is financial capital, which
can be used as resources for borrowing and lending in the financial sector. If countries are
internationally integrated, financial capital is traded in the international financial market.
2.1 Production Sector
Final goods are produced from real capital and labor. Similar to Barro (1990) and Futagami
et al. (1993), we incorporate public capital into the production function. Specifically, the
production function is given by a Cobb-Douglas form as follows:
Yt = AZ
α
t [(1− θt) gtLt]
1−α ,
where Y is the output, L is the aggregate labor, Z is the aggregate real capital, and A is the
technology level of the production function. We denote public spending per young agent by
g. Because there are leakages of public spending due to the government corruption, public
capital is created from public spending with a less-than-one-for-one relationship. Specifically,
public capital is given by (1− θ) g where 0 < θ < 1. θg is waste from the perspective of the
production sector. The wasted resources are embezzled by individuals colluding with the
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government. In other words, θ is thought of as the misappropriation share of public funds,
which will be determined by the government’s collective decision.
Because the government imposes corporate tax on the final production, the representative
firm maximizes its net profit, (1− τt)Yt − wtLt − qtZt, where τ is the tax rate on the
final production, w is the wage rate, and q is the price of the real capital. Note that the
representative firm maximizes its profit, taking the government’s behavior as given. In this
sense, the government and the representative firm are in a game-theoretic situation, where
the government is a Stackelberg leader and the representative firm is a Stackelberg follower.
Given the misappropriation rate, θ, and the tax rate, τ , the production factors in competitive
markets are paid their marginal products:
qt = α (1− τt)Yt/Zt (1)
wt = (1− α) (1− τt)Yt/Lt. (2)
2.2 Individuals
Each individual faces budget constraints in the first and second periods as follows:
kt + dt ≤ wt, (3)
and
ct+1 ≤ qt+1φkt + rt+1dt, (4)
where k is the investment in a project and d is lending when positive and borrowing when
negative. If an individual starts an investment project when young, then he/she produces
real capital φk in the second period sold to the representative firm at price q, and φ is the
productivity of real capital production. If he/she lends financial capital in the first period,
he/she receives the gross return, r, from the lending in the second period. If he/she borrows
financial capital in the first period, he/she pays the gross interest rate r in the second period,
the same rate as borne on the lending.
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Due to an agency problem, investors face borrowing constraints. Following Aghion et al.
(2005), a credit constraint facing each individual is given by:
dt ≥ −νwt, (5)
where ν ∈ [0,∞) is the measure of the degree of credit constraints. We note that individuals
can borrow financial capital up to ν times w. w is considered a down-payment for the
investment project. In Appendix A.1, we provide two kinds of microfoundations for Eq.
(5).6 The non-negativity constraint for the investment project is given by:
kt ≥ 0. (6)
Now we introduce heterogeneity of individuals with respect to the productivity of real
capital creation. Specifically, the productivity φ varies between individuals and is distributed
uniformly over [0, 1]. Each individual knows his/her own productivity at birth, while other
individuals do not know their productivity.
Each individual maximizes ct+1 subject to inequalities (3)-(6). The maximization problem
is rewritten as:
max
dt
(rt+1 − φqt+1) dt
subject to
− μ
1− μwt ≤ dt ≤ wt,
where μ := ν
1+ν . When rt+1−φqt+1 > 0, it is optimal for an individual to choose dt = wt and
kt = 0, whereas when rt+1−φqt+1 < 0, then it is optimal to choose dt = − μwt1−μ and kt =
wt
1−μ .
Formally, we obtain:
Lemma 1 Let φt := rt+1qt+1 . The following hold.
• If φt > φ, then kt = 0 and dt = wt.
6We implicitly assume the existence of a financial intermediary for the loan contracts between savers and
borrowers. See Appendix A.1 for the microfoundations for a credit constraint (5). This type of assumption
for credit market imperfections is often imposed in the literature (e.g., Aghion and Barnergee, 2005; Aghion
et al, 1999; Aghion et al., 2005). Even if we replace the inequality (5) with bt ≥ −μkt where μ ∈ [0, 1), this
alternative credit constraint is equivalent to the inequality (5), and the same results will be obtained.
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• If φt < φ, then kt = wt1−μ and dt = − μwt1−μ .
2.3 The Government’s Behavior
The government runs a balanced budget, which is given by:
gt+1Lt+1 = τt+1Yt+1.
Using this equation, we rewrite the production function as follows:
Yt+1 = A
1/α (1− θt+1)(1−α)/α τ (1−α)/αt+1 Zt+1, (7)
Thus the capital price and wage become:
qt+1 = αA1/α (1− τt+1) (1− θt+1)(1−α)/α τ (1−α)/αt+1 (8)
wt+1 = (1− α)A1/α (1− τt+1) (1− θt+1)(1−α)/α τ (1−α)/αt+1 zt+1, (9)
where zt+1 := Zt+1/Lt+1.
The aggregate real capital supplied by investors is given by:
Zt+1 =
Z 1
φt
φktLtdφ =
wt (1− φ2t )
2 (1− μ) Lt. (10)
Because Lt+1 = Lt and from Eqs. (9) and (10), we obtain the law of motion of real capital
as follows:
zt+1 =
(1− τt) τ (1−α)/αt (1− α)A1/α (1− θt)
(1−α)/α (1− φ2t )
2 (1− μ) zt. (11)
The dynamics of real capital is subject to the tax rate, the misappropriation share of public
funds, the degree of credit constraints, and the number of savers (borrowers).
We assume that the proportion γ of the total population in each generation is involved
in a political process, and they misappropriate public funds. Collective decisions on both
the tax rate (τt+1) and the degree of political corruption (θt+1) are made by agents born at
time t and colluding with the government. They maximize a geometric average between per
capita consumption and embezzlement of public funds as follows:
max
τt+1,θt+1
c¯1−βt+1 b
β
t+1,
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where c¯ is the per capita consumption and b is the per capita embezzlement received by agents
colluding the government. β is a measure of the degree of political corruption.7 Because
the government is a Stackelberg leader, it solves its maximization problem by taking into
account the representative firm’s first-order conditions, namely, Eqs. (8) and (9).
Consumption by individuals with φ < φt is given by ct+1 = φtqt+1wt and consumption
by individuals with φ > φt+1 is given by ct+1 = 11−μ(φ− μφt)qt+1wt. Therefore, we obtain:
c¯t+1
qt+1wt
= φt
Z φt
0
dφ+ 1
1− μ
Z 1
φt
(φ− μφt)dφ,
=
1
2 (1− μ)
¡
φ2t − 2μφt + 1
¢
. (12)
It follows from Eqs. (7) and (10) that:
Yt+1 = A
1/α (1− θt+1)(1−α)/α τ (1−α)/αt+1
¡
1− φ2t
¢
wtLt/ (2 (1− μ)) .
Hence, the per capita embezzlement of public fund, bt+1 = θt+1gt+1/γ, is given by:
bt+1 =
θt+1τt+1Yt+1
γLt
= A1/αθt+1 (1− θt+1)(1−α)/α τ 1/αt+1
(1− φ2t )wt
2 (1− μ) γ .
Because the choice variables of the collective decisions are τt+1 and θt+1, and qt+1 is
given by Eq. (8), the government’s maximization problem is converted into two independent
maximization problems:
max
τt+1
(1− τt+1)1−β τ
(1−α)(1−β)+β
α
t+1 ,
and
max
θt+1
(1− θt+1)
1−α
α θβt+1.
The solutions to these two maximization problems are given by:
τ ∗ := (1− α) (1− β) + β
and
θ∗ := αβ
(1− α) (1− β) + β .
7This maximization is equivalent to the maximization of a geometric average between the total disposable
income and the total embezzlement at time t+ 1, that is, maxτt+1,θt+1 [(1− τt+1)Yt+1]
1−β
[θt+1τt+1Yt+1]β .
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These two solutions imply that the corporate tax rate and the misappropriation share of
public funds are increasing functions with respect to the degree of political corruption. If
there are no corruption motives, that is, β = 0, the tax rate is equal to 1 − α, which is the
same rate that Barro (1990) derives.
Thus far, we have considered only the misappropriation of public funds as government
corruption. However, we can view government corruption from the perspective of bribes, as
well. The tax rate 1−α maximizes per capita consumption. Therefore, we consider that the
representative firm bribes government oﬃcials with [τ ∗ − (1 − α)]Y = αβY as the corrupt
oﬃcials require the representative firm to do so. The representative firm must think of αβY
as an extra tax payment that would not have been incurred if the government had not been
corrupt.
Since (1− θ∗)τ ∗ = 1− α, the capital price and wage rate become:
q¯ : = αA1/α (1− α)(1−α)/α (1− τ ∗) (13)
w¯t : = (1− α)1/αA1/αzt (1− τ ∗) . (14)
Defining the growth rate of an economy as Γt+1 := zt+1zt , we have:
Γt+1 := (1− τ
∗) (1− α)1/αA1/α (1− φ2t )
2 (1− μ) . (15)
3 Equilibrium Growth Rates
The equilibrium growth rate is derived from Eq. (15) such that the domestic financial market
clears (in the case of a closed economy model) or the world financial market clears (in the
case of a two-country model).
3.1 Closed Economy Model
In a closed economy, the financial market clears within a country. From Lemma 1, the
financial market clearing condition is given by:
wtφt −
μwt
1− μ (1− φt) = 0,
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or equivalently,
φt = μ. (16)
In this case, the equilibrium growth rate of the closed economy becomes:
Γt+1 := (1− τ
∗) (1− α)1/αA1/α (1− μ2)
2 (1− μ) . (17)
Note that the growth rate declines as the corruption parameter, β, increases in a closed
economy due to the higher tax rate on the wage income.
3.2 Two-Country Model
Now we suppose that the world economy consists of two countries, say country 1 and country
2. To investigate the eﬀects of government corruption on economic growth, we assume that
the two countries are identical in terms of the degree of credit constraints, technology, and
size of the population but not identical for the degree of government corruption. We impose
a parameter condition in Assumption 1 below.
Assumption 1
μ
¡
1− β1
¢
≤ 1− β2 < 1− β1. (18)
In the second inequality of Assumption 1, we suppose that the degree of corruption of
country 1 is less than that of country 2, that is, β1 < β2. Accordingly, the equilibrium tax
rate of country 1 is less than that of country 2 (τ 1 < τ 2). The misappropriation share of
public funds of country 1 is less than that of country 2 (θ1 < θ2) as well. The first inequality
guarantees that φ2t is less than one for all t ≥ 0. In other words, there are always agents who
create capital in country 2 due to the first inequality.8 If the degree of credit constraints, μ,
is so large that μ (1− β1) > 1 − β2, then no one will produce real capital in country 2 for
suﬃciently large t. We avoid this case for simplicity.
If each country is a closed economy, the growth rate of country 1 is greater than that
of country 2 because τ 1 < τ 2. However, if the two countries are financially integrated at
8As it holds that φ1t < φ2t in equilibrium, φ1t < 1 is always guaranteed.
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time t, they face a common world interest rate at time t + 1. Therefore, it holds that
rt+1 = q¯
1φ1t = q¯2φ2t , which is rewritten as:¡
1− β1
¢
φ1t =
¡
1− β2
¢
φ2t
because 1 − τ i = α (1− βi). It follows from β1 < β2 that φ1t < φ2t , implying that when the
two countries are financially integrated, the number of savers (borrowers) in country 2 is
greater (smaller) than in country 1.
Because the international financial market clears over the two countries, it must hold
that B1t+1 + B
2
t+1 = 0 where the foreign financial asset that country i holds is given by
Bit+1 :=
φit−μ
1−μ w
i
tLt. From the last and from 1− τ i = α (1− βi), we have:¡
φ1t − μ
¢ ¡
1− β1
¢
z1t +
¡
φ2t − μ
¢ ¡
1− β2
¢
z2t = 0. (19)
It follows from φ1t < φ2t and Eq. (19) that φ1t < μ < φ2t for all t ≥ 0.9 Note from Eqs. (15)
and (17) that the eﬀects of government corruption are reflected only in the tax on the wage
income in a closed economy model, whereas the eﬀects are reflected in both the tax rate and
the cutoﬀ, φit, in the two-country model. The taxation reduces the return on investment and
financial capital flows out of a country with a higher tax rate into a country with a lower
tax rate. Now we can compare the growth rates between country 1 and country 2.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, suppose that country 1 and country 2 are identical in
terms of the degree of credit constraints, technology, preference, and size of the population,
but diﬀerent in the degree of corruption. Then, the ranking of the growth rates is as follows:
Γ1o > Γ1c > Γ2c > Γ2o,
where Γio and Γic are the growth rates in country i when it is an open economy and a closed
economy, respectively.
Proof: Obviously, we have Γ1c > Γ2c because τ 1 < τ 2. It follows from φ1t < μ < φ2t and
Eq. (15) that Γ1o > Γ1c and Γ2c > Γ2o. ¤
9Although we do not analyze the dynamic behavior of φit, it suﬃces to know that φ1t < μ < φ2t when
comparing growth rates.
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4 Discussion
While Γ1o and Γ2o in Proposition 1 are time-variant, the ranking of the growth rates does not
change. Proposition 1 generically implies that capital account liberalization is beneficial to a
less corrupt country relative to other countries, whereas it is unfavorable to a highly corrupt
country. The diﬀerences in the growth rates between the two countries are magnified by
capital account liberalization.
The equilibrium interest rate in a less corrupt country is greater than the one in a highly
corrupt county when each is a closed economy. This is because the return on an investment
project is greater in the less corrupt country than in the highly corrupt country. Because
the growth rate in a closed economy is independent of the interest rate, the negative eﬀect
of corruption on economic growth is reflected only in the tax rate on wage income.
Once the two countries are financially integrated, financial capital flows in a country with
a high interest rate from a country with a low interest rate, as is well known in international
economics, and in equilibrium, both countries face the common world interest rate. The
eﬀects of inflow and outflow of financial capital on economic growth are reflected in the
equilibrium cutoﬀ, φit. The number of savers in a highly (less) corrupt country is greater
(less) than that in a less (highly) corrupt country. The eﬀects of inflow and outflow of
financial capital on economic growth magnify the negative eﬀects of government corruption
when the capital account is liberalized. As a result, the diﬀerence in the growth rates between
the two countries is enlarged.
5 Empirical Evidence
We have theoretically demonstrated that capital account liberalization is beneficial to less
corrupt countries but is disadvantageous to highly corrupt countries. In this section, we
empirically verify this proposition.
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5.1 Data
The data were drawn from various databases. Depending upon the availability of the dataset,
we assembled the annual data for 111 countries over the period from 1985-2009. Countries
in our sample are listed in Table A1 in Appendix A.2. We averaged each variable for
five years, following the procedure employed by the literature on growth regressions (see
for instance Levine et al., 2000). Accordingly, we created the dataset for the following
non-overlapping five periods: 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2009.
The use of five-year averaged data enables us to mitigate noises associated with short-run
economic fluctuations.
The growth rates of per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) were calculated by
using per capita real GDP obtained from the World Development Indicators by World Bank
(2010b). The capital account openness index developed by Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008) is
used for the measure of capital account liberalization (henceforth, we call this “financial
openness”). The Chinn-Ito index is a de jure measure of capital account openness, which
reflects the intensity of capital controls and the nature of capital control policies. The values
of the Chinn-Ito index range from −1.8312 to 2.5000, with larger values indicating greater
capital account liberalization.10 It is diﬃcult to measure corruption because corruption
is illegal and no one reports that he/she engages in corruption. We use the corruption
index created by the Political Risk Services Group (PRS Group, 2011), which publishes the
International Country Risk Guide. This corruption index is a perception-based, subjective
index that reflects an assessment of corruption within the political system. While the original
index ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt), we rescaled this index from 0 (least
corrupt) to 6 (most corrupt) so that we can interpret the index more easily.
We incorporate various control variables used in the growth regression literature in our
estimation. We include the natural logarithm of the initial real GDP per capita to control
10Because the Chinn-Ito index is available until 2008, we averaged the index from 2005-2008 for the last
period.
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for the stage of economic development. The initial real GDP per capita was taken from the
World Development Indicators by World Bank (2010b).
We also include education, the private credit/GDP ratio, and investment. Education
is a proxy for human capital, which is measured by the average years of total schooling of
the population over age 15, developed by Barro and Lee (2010). The private credit/GDP
ratio is often used as a proxy for financial development in the literature on finance and
growth.11 The private credit/GDP ratio was obtained from Beck et al. (2010), which is
entitled “private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP” in
their database. The data for investment were assembled from the “investment share of GDP
per capita” in the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2011). For robustness checks, we also
control for trade, inflation, population growth, government expenditure, and life expectancy,
all of which were obtained from the World Development Indicators created by World Bank
(2010b). The detailed definitions and data sources are provided in Table A2 in Appendix
A.2. The descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table A3 in Appendix A.2.
5.2 Estimation Method
When examining the eﬀects that corruption and its interaction with financial openness have
on economic growth, we must care about the reverse causality from economic growth to
corruption. For instance, if the growth rate is low, the salary of the government oﬃcials
might be very low because of the low tax revenue. In that case, the government oﬃcials have
greater incentives to accept bribes, and thus corruption will be more prevalent in such an
economy. To control for such simultaneity bias, we conduct a dynamic panel data analysis
with country-specific fixed eﬀects.
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998)
develop the linear generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators for dynamic panel
models. In our analysis, we specifically use the system GMM estimators.12 We estimate the
11See Levine (2005).
12See Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) for the moment conditions.
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following equation:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (α1 − 1) yi,t−1 + α2Financial opennessi,t
+α3Financial opennessi,t × Corruptioni,t +Xi,tβ + μt + ηi + ui,t.
where i and t represent a country and time, respectively. μ is a time-specific eﬀect, η is a
country-specific eﬀect, and u is an error term. y is the logarithm of per capita real GDP.
Other than the endogeneity of corruption, we have good reason to use the system GMM
because yi,t−1 is not strictly exogenous but is predetermined. Note that we can regard
yi,t− yi,t−1 as the average growth rate within the tth period. X is the set of control variables
including a constant. Our theory predicts that α3 is negative because financial globalization
leads to a decrease in the growth rate of a highly corrupt country, whereas α2 is positive
because financial globalization leads to an increase in the growth rate of a less corrupt
country.
To obtain consistent estimates, we must address the validity of the instruments. There-
fore, we consider two specification tests. The first test examines the hypothesis that the
error terms are not serially correlated, and for that purpose we test whether the diﬀerenced
error terms are serially correlated with respect to the second order.13 The second test is the
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the orthogonality conditions of the
instruments.
We must also care about small sample bias associated with an estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix because the number of countries in our dataset is, at most, 111, and thus
our sample size is limited. In the second-step estimation when performing the two-step
system GMM, the residuals from the first-step estimation are used to produce a consistent
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix; however, the obtained estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix is severely downward biased if the sample size is small. Windmeijer
(2005) develops corrected standard errors to correct such a small sample bias. We report
13Because we examine the diﬀerenced error terms, the examination of the first order serial correlation
makes no sense.
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Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors in our estimation results when performing the
two-step system GMM.
Given the size of our sample, we must also consider the number of moment restrictions
because if we use too many instruments, the system GMM estimators are unable to elimi-
nate endogenous components. Moreover, too many instruments also reduce the power of the
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions (See Bowsher, 2002; Roodman, 2009; and Zil-
iak, 1997). Therefore, we use only the two-to-three-period lagged variables as instrumental
variables.
5.3 Results
Table 1 presents the estimation results without the interaction term between financial open-
ness and corruption as a benchmark. In columns (2) through (5), we report the results of
the system GMM, and in column (1), we report the result of the OLS estimation, which may
be biased due to reverse causality and/or omitted variables.
[Table 1 here]
All of the regressions including the OLS estimation show the insignificance of the coeﬃ-
cient of corruption, although all the signs of the coeﬃcients except for that of column (2) are
negative. The coeﬃcients of financial openness are negative in columns (2) through (5), and
they are significant in columns (2) and (3). Both human capital and investment significantly
and positively enter into all estimations as they do in the literature on empirical growth
(e.g., Barro, 1991). However, a somewhat surprising result is that private credit, which is
a proxy for financial development, has a significantly negative impact on economic growth.
This result is obtained even though we eliminate investment from our estimations. While
this result contradicts the traditional literature on finance and growth (Aghion et al., 2005;
Levine, 2005; Levine et al., 2000), it is consistent with the empirical results recently obtained
by Loayza and Rancie`re (2006), Saci et al. (2009), and Rousseau and Wachtel (2011).14
14There is debate on the relationship between finance and growth. The recent evidence shows that the
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To investigate the validity of instrumental variables in columns (2) through (5), we per-
form the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The Hansen tests of over-identifying
restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions at the conventional significance level
for all the estimations in columns (2) through (5). For the system GMM estimator to be
consistent, no serial correlations of the error terms should exist. We examine whether the
diﬀerenced error terms in columns (2) through (5) are serially correlated with respect to the
second order. The p-values are so large that the AR(2) tests cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no second-order serial correlation.
Table 2 shows our main estimation results, including the interaction term between fi-
nancial openness and corruption. Both financial openness and the interaction term insignif-
icantly enter into the OLS estimation in column (1). As mentioned above, however, the
OLS estimates are probably biased due to the problem of endogeneity. In the system GMM
estimations in columns (2) through (5), both the coeﬃcients of financial openness and its
interaction with corruption are statistically significant at the conventional significance level.
The negative signs of the interaction terms between financial openness and corruption imply
that the partial impact of financial openness on economic growth decreases as the degree
of corruption increases. For example, column (5) shows that the partial impact of finan-
cial openness is given by (0.0108− 0.0040× corruption), which provides the threshold value,
2.702, of corruption that divides countries into those with the positive partial impact and
those with the negative partial impact of financial openness on economic growth. In other
words, if the degree of corruption is below this threshold, the partial eﬀect of financial
openness on economic growth is positive, whereas if the degree of corruption is above this
threshold, its partial eﬀect is negative. These results are consistent with our theoretical pre-
development of financial intermediation has a negative impact on growth in the short run and a positive
impact in the long run (Loayza and Rancie`re, 2006). Because each data point of our dataset was created by
averaging the original data points for only five years, the short-run eﬀect of financial development on economic
growth probably dominates the long-run eﬀect. There is also evidence indicating that the development of
financial intermediation has a negative impact on growth if the data points are extended until quite recently
(Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011). Therefore, revisiting the empirical claims on the relationship between finance
and growth should be necessary for future research.
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dictions. Note that the coeﬃcients of corruption in all regressions are insignificant. Hence,
we eliminate this variable in Table 3.
[Table 2 here]
While Table 3 presents almost the same results as those in Table 2, we find that the
significance levels of the interaction terms in columns (2) through (5) are 1%, which are better
than in Table 2. The significance levels of financial openness in columns (2) through (5) are
5%, which are also better than in Table 2. The absolute values of the coeﬃcients of financial
openness and their interactions with corruption are stable in all estimations in Tables 2 and
3. The Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions
at the conventional significance level, and the tests for serial correlations do not reject the
null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in all estimations.
[Table 3 here]
For robustness checks, we control for various variables that have been considered as im-
portant determinants of economic growth in previous studies (e.g., Levine and Renelt, 1992).
Tables 4 and 5 provide the results with and without controlling for corruption, respectively.
Except for the case in which inflation is controlled for, all the results of financial openness
and its interaction term with corruption are the same as those in the previous estimations
even though we control for trade openness, population growth, government expenditure, and
life expectancy.15 The Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions and the serial correlation
tests show the validity of instrumental variables in all estimations.
[Table 4 here]
[Table 5 here]
15In column (2) in Table 4, while the coeﬃcient of financial openness is not significant, the coeﬃcient of
its interaction with corruption is significantly negative as our theory predicts. In addition, in column (2) in
Table 5, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term between financial openness and corruption is significant at
the 11% significance level.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated how the interaction of capital account liberalization and government
corruption aﬀects economic growth both theoretically and empirically. Our theoretical re-
sults are as follows. Highly corrupt countries tend to impose higher tax rates than do less
corrupt countries, and thus, the negative impacts of government corruption on economic
growth are magnified in the highly corrupt countries if countries liberalize their capital ac-
count. On the other hand, the negative impacts of government corruption are reduced in
the less corrupt countries if countries liberalize their capital account because of the inflow
of financial capital from the highly corrupt countries. As a result, the least corrupt, finan-
cially open countries experience the highest growth rates; the least corrupt, financially closed
countries experience the second highest growth rates; the highly corrupt, financially closed
countries experience the third highest growth rates; and the highly corrupt, financially open
countries experience the lowest growth rates. Empirical evidence obtained from an analysis
of the panel data collected from 111 countries is supportive of our theoretical predictions.
Our contributions are novel in the literature both on corruption and growth and on
financial globalization and its eﬀects on economies in that we have studied the interactive
eﬀects of capital account liberalization and government corruption on economic growth. We
believe that our research contributes to the recent policy debates on the merits or demerits
of capital account liberalization.
Appendix
A.1. Microfoundations for Credit Constraints
We describe two types of microfoundations for a credit constraint in this Appendix.
Microfoundation I
We follow the model settings of Aghion et al. (1999), Aghion and Banerjee (2005), and
Aghion et al. (2005) to provide a microfoundation.
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When borrowing, each agent is endowed with his/her own wealth wt, which is wages
earned when he/she is young. Therefore, his/her total resources to invest are kt = wt − dt.
As seen in the main text, qt+1φ is the return on one unit of investment. If a borrower
faithfully repays his/her obligations, he/she earns a net income, qt+1φkt + rt+1dt. On the
other hand, if the borrower does not repay his/her obligations, he/she has to incur a cost, δkt,
to conceal his/her revenue. If this happens, a financial intermediary monitors the borrower
and captures him/her with probability pt+1. Hence, if he/she decides to default, he/she
obtains the expected income, qt+1φkt − δkt + pt+1rt+1dt.
The incentive compatibility constraint under this lending contract, which leads the bor-
rower not to default, is as follows:
qt+1φkt + rt+1dt ≥ [qt+1φ− δ] kt + pt+1rt+1dt, (A.1)
which is rewritten as:
dt ≥ −
δ
rt+1 (1− pt+1)
kt, (A.2)
The borrower acquires the revenue given in the left-hand side of Eq. (A.1) when he/she
starts a project and faithfully repays his/her obligations. The borrower’s gain when he/she
defaults is given in the right-hand side. Note that Eq. (A.2) is independent of the return on
one unit of investment.
The financial intermediary selects the optimal probability pt+1 to detect the borrower’s
deception; however, it incurs an eﬀort cost, dtΦ(pt+1), so as to attain the optimal probability.
The eﬀort cost is increasing and convex with respect to pt+1. As in Aghion and Banerjee
(2005), we assume Φ(pt+1) = κ log(1− pt+1), where κ is strictly greater than δ such that all
borrowers face credit constraints more severe than their natural debt limits. The financial
intermediary solves the following maximization problem:
max
pt+1
− pt+1rt+1dt − κ log (1− pt+1) dt.
Because −dt > 0, this maximization problem is equivalent to:
max
pt+1
pt+1rt+1 + κ log (1− pt+1) .
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From the first-order condition, we have:
rt+1 =
κ
1− pt+1
. (A.3)
The increase in the interest rate rt+1 leads to the high probability of detecting defaulting
borrowers. From Eqs. (A.2) and (A.3), we obtain:
dt ≥ −
δ
κkt,
or equivalently,
dt ≥ −
δ
κ− δwt. (A.4)
Although the financial intermediary does not impose agent-specific credit constraints because
the agent’s productivity φ is unobservable, it must know the agent’s wealth, wt. None will
default in equilibrium providing the financial intermediary imposes a credit constraint given
by the inequality (A.4) on all agents. Because δ < κ, we can let ν := δ/ (κ− δ) ∈ [0,∞),
and thus:
dt ≥ −νwt.
This is a credit constraint in the main text. δ and κ are respectively associated with a default
cost and a monitoring cost. As δ increases or κ decreases, a financial market is considered
to be fully developed.
Microfoundation II
Antra`s and Caballero (2009) develop a microfoundation for a credit constraint. We extend
their microfoundation in a manner suitable for our model. We consider the participation
constraint faced by the financial intermediary and the incentive compatibility constraint of
the borrowers which leads them not to default.
At the end of the first period of each borrower’s lifetime and after investment has occurred,
any borrower can walk away without carrying out his/her investment project. He/she takes
some fraction of his/her investment with no cost, (1− μ) (wt − dt), where 0 < μ < 1 without
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repaying his/her obligations to the financial intermediary. In this case, the borrower will be
engaged in real capital production somewhere and sell the real capital in a market.
If a borrower absconds at the end of the first period, the financial intermediary can
withdraw the remainder of the investment, μ (wt − dt). We assume that the financial inter-
mediary can relend the remainder of the investment in the financial market. This implies
that when making a financial contract with a borrower, the financial intermediary faces a
participation constraint such that:
rt+1μ (wt − dt) ≥ −rt+1dt,
or equivalently,
dt ≥ −
μ
1− μwt.
The incentive compatibility constraint for a borrower, which leads him/her not to abscond
from engaging in his/her project, is given by:
φqt+1 (wt − dt) + rt+1dt ≥ φqt+1 (1− μ) (wt − dt) . (A.5)
Eq. (A.5) always holds for agents with φ such that rt+1 − μφqt+1 ≤ 0. Hence, we focus on
agents with φ such that rt+1 − μφqt+1 > 0. Then, Eq. (A.5) becomes:
dt ≥ −
μ
(φt/φ)− μ
w. (A.6)
Because it follows that φt/φ ≤ 1 in equilibrium, we obtain−μ/ ((φt/φ)− μ) ≤ −μ/ (1− μ),
which implies that Eq. (A.6) is redundant.
In sum, borrowers never default if the financial intermediary imposes a credit constraint
dt ≥ −μwt/ (1− μ), which is the participation constraint of the financial intermediary. Let-
ting μ/ (1− μ) := ν, we have the credit constraint bt ≥ −νwt as shown in the main text.
As μ or ν increases, it becomes more diﬃcult for the borrowers to withdraw their invest-
ment without repaying their obligations. If we consider these variables as being associated
with the legal protection of the lenders, a financial market fully develops as the variables
increase.
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A.2. Data Description
[Table A1 here]
[Table A2 here]
[Table A3 here]
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Table 1: Financial openness, corruption, and economic growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS System System System System
GMM GMM GMM GMM
Logarithm of initial -0.0025* -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0028 -0.0062
GDP per capita (0.0014) (0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0048) (0.0050)
Financial Openness 0.0006 -0.0038* -0.0024 -0.0040* -0.0022
(0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Corruption -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0029 -0.0056
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0041)
Education 0.0030*** 0.0093*** 0.0096*** 0.0089*** 0.0088***
(0.0006) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0025)
Private Credit -0.0117*** -0.0186** -0.0238** -0.0221*** -0.0255***
(0.0029) (0.0080) (0.0094) (0.0078) (0.0078)
Investment 0.0822*** 0.1436*** 0.1418*** 0.1809*** 0.1915***
(0.0183) (0.0398) (0.0422) (0.0432) (0.0514)
Constant 0.0025 -0.0588 -0.0469 -0.0441 -0.0090
(0.0115) (0.0357) (0.0460) (0.0362) (0.0390)
Year dummies Yes No No Yes Yes
One-step Two-step One-step Two-step
No. of instruments 41 41 45 45
AR (2) test p=0.93 p=0.93 p=0.90 p=0.78
Hansen test p=0.20 p=0.20 p=0.18 p=0.18
No. of countries 111 111 111 111 111
Observations 497 497 497 497 497
Notes: The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, re-
spectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. In particular, in the
“Two-Step” estimations, Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors are provided. All
the regressions, including the OLS estimation, show the insignificance of the coeﬃcient of
corruption. The coeﬃcients of financial openness are negative in columns (2) through (5),
and they are significant in columns (2) and (3).“p =” is the p-value of a statistical test. The
Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions at
the conventional significance level for all estimations. We test whether the diﬀerenced error
terms are serially correlated with respect to the second order. The p-values are so large that
the AR(2) tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation.
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Table 2: The interaction eﬀects of financial openness and corruption
on economic growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS System System System System
GMM GMM GMM GMM
Logarithm of initial -0.0025* -0.0030 -0.0048 -0.0040 -0.0070
GDP per capita (0.0014) (0.0051) (0.0069) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Financial Openness 0.0009 0.0081* 0.0086* 0.0085* 0.0108**
(0.0016) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0047)
Corruption -0.0008 0.0013 0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0033)
Financial Openness -0.0001 -0.0036** -0.0036*** -0.0035** -0.0040***
×Corruption (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Education 0.0031*** 0.0091*** 0.0098*** 0.0088*** 0.0096***
(0.0006) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Private Credit -0.0119*** -0.0224*** -0.0250*** -0.0252*** -0.0274***
(0.0030) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0070)
Investment 0.0826*** 0.1667*** 0.1503*** 0.1960*** 0.1907***
(0.0185) (0.0392) (0.0370) (0.0422) (0.0421)
Constant 0.0021 -0.0531 -0.0371 -0.0446 -0.0214
(0.0120) (0.0372) (0.0479) (0.0355) (0.0372)
Year dummies Yes No No Yes Yes
One-step Two-step One-step Two-step
No. of instruments 47 47 51 51
AR (2) test p=0.95 p=0.97 p=0.90 p=0.91
Hansen test p=0.36 p=0.36 p=0.37 p=0.37
No. of countries 111 111 111 111 111
Observations 497 497 497 497 497
Notes: The interaction term between financial openness and corruption is incorporated in
the estimations. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. In particular,
in the “Two-Step” estimations, Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors are provided.
The OLS estimates are probably biased due to the problem of endogeneity. In the system
GMM estimations, both coeﬃcients of financial openness and its interaction with corruption
are statistically significant at the conventional significance level. The negative signs of the
interaction terms between financial openness and corruption imply that the partial impact of
financial openness on economic growth decreases as the degree of corruption increases. “p =”
is the p-value of a statistical test. The Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions do not
reject the orthogonality conditions at the conventional significance level for all estimations.
We test whether the diﬀerenced error terms are serially correlated with respect to the second
order. The p-values are so large that the AR(2) tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no
second-order serial correlation.
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Table 3: The interaction eﬀects of financial openness and corruption
on economic growth without a corruption term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS System System System System
GMM GMM GMM GMM
Logarithm of initial -0.0023* -0.0009 -0.0054 0.0006 -0.0046
GDP per capita (0.0013) (0.0045) (0.0060) (0.0049) (0.0044)
Financial Openness 0.0013 0.0109** 0.0104** 0.0100** 0.0105**
(0.0014) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0046)
Financial Openness -0.0002 -0.0043*** -0.0039** -0.0042*** -0.0043***
×Corruption (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015)
Education 0.0031*** 0.0089*** 0.0094*** 0.0086*** 0.0093***
(0.0006) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0026)
Private Credit -0.0114*** -0.0296*** -0.0269*** -0.0324*** -0.0326***
(0.0030) (0.0089) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0063)
Investment 0.0821*** 0.1956*** 0.1779*** 0.2099*** 0.2257***
(0.0184) (0.0434) (0.0420) (0.0444) (0.0395)
Constant -0.0022 -0.0678** -0.0322 -0.0804** -0.0452
(0.0087) (0.0318) (0.0389) (0.0311) (0.0297)
Year dummies Yes No No Yes Yes
One-step Two-step One-step Two-step
No. of instruments 41 41 45 45
AR (2) test p=0.98 p=0.99 p=0.92 p=0.89
Hansen test p=0.48 p=0.48 p=0.59 p=0.59
No. of countries 111 111 111 111 111
Observations 497 497 497 497 497
Notes: The interaction term between financial openness and corruption is incorporated in
the estimations, but the “Corruption” term is eliminated because of its insignificance in
estimations in Table 2. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. In particular,
in the “Two-Step” estimations, Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors are provided.
The estimation results are similar to those of Table 2. “p =” is the p-value of a statistical test.
The Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions
at the conventional significance level for all estimations. We test whether the diﬀerenced
error terms are serially correlated with respect to the second order. The p-values are so large
that the AR(2) tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation.
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Table 4: Robustness analysis on the interaction eﬀects of financial openness
and corruption on economic growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
System System System System System
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Logarithm of initial -0.0023 -0.0049 -0.0088 -0.0015 -0.0102
GDP per capita (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0066) (0.0067)
Financial Openness 0.0099** 0.0074 0.0134*** 0.0103** 0.0113**
(0.0041) (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0046)
Corruption 0.0004 0.0018 -0.0036 0.0026 -0.0002
(0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0029)
Financial Openness -0.0038*** -0.0032* -0.0049*** -0.0038*** -0.0043***
×Corruption (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015)
Education 0.0077*** 0.0117*** 0.0102*** 0.0063 0.0079***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0041) (0.0023)
Private Credit -0.0314*** -0.0278*** -0.0255*** -0.0277*** -0.0277***
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0081)
Investment 0.1746*** 0.1518*** 0.1757*** 0.2124*** 0.1842***
(0.0372) (0.0508) (0.0384) (0.0393) (0.0378)
Trade 0.0073
(0.0066)
Inflation -0.0016
(0.0045)
Population Growth -0.1330
(0.0968)
Government Expenditure -0.3392
(0.5539)
Life Expectancy 0.0015**
(0.0006)
Constant -0.0485 -0.0492 0.0206 -0.0495 -0.0815*
(0.0347) (0.0369) (0.0328) (0.0366) (0.0419)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-step Two-step Two-step Two-step Two-step
No. of instruments 57 57 57 57 57
AR (2) test p=1.00 p=0.70 p=0.90 p=0.99 p=0.97
Hansen test p=0.50 p=0.34 p=0.58 p=0.34 p=0.27
No. of countries 111 111 111 111 111
Observations 492 488 496 497 497
Notes: We add various control variables to the estimations in Table 2. The asterisks ***,
**, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers
in parentheses are robust standard errors. In particular, in the “Two-Step” estimations,
Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors are provided. The estimation results are
similar to those of Table 2. “p =” is the p-value of a statistical test. The Hansen tests of
over-identifying restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions at the conventional
significance level for all estimations. We test whether the diﬀerenced error terms are serially
correlated with respect to the second order. The p-values are so large that the AR(2) tests
do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation.
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Table 5: Robustness analysis on the interaction eﬀects of financial openness
and corruption on economic growth without a corruption term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
System System System System System
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Logarithm of initial -0.0027 -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0001 -0.0046
GDP per capita (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0062)
Financial Openness 0.0124*** 0.0069 0.0127*** 0.0106** 0.0116**
(0.0039) (0.0060) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0045)
Financial Openness -0.0043*** -0.0033 -0.0049*** -0.0041*** -0.0046***
×Corruption (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Education 0.0066** 0.0124*** 0.0091*** 0.0059 0.0074***
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0023)
Private Credit -0.0327*** -0.0332*** -0.0267*** -0.0374*** -0.0338***
(0.0069) (0.0075) (0.0057) (0.0068) (0.0084)
Investment 0.2081*** 0.1740*** 0.1743*** 0.2633*** 0.2091***
(0.0450) (0.0525) (0.0468) (0.0360) (0.0435)
Trade 0.0080
(0.0068)
Inflation 0.0003
(0.0032)
Population Growth -0.1104
(0.0985)
Government Expenditure -0.1600
(0.3232)
Life Expectancy 0.0011
(0.0008)
Constant -0.0448 -0.0621** -0.0242 -0.0622** -0.1018***
(0.0302) (0.0312) (0.0252) (0.0301) (0.0349)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-step Two-step Two-step Two-step Two-step
No. of instruments 51 51 51 51 51
AR (2) test p=0.97 p=0.81 p=0.92 p=0.88 p=0.99
Hansen test p=0.70 p=0.22 p=0.54 p=0.46 p=0.28
No. of countries 111 111 111 111 111
Observations 492 488 496 497 497
Notes: We add various control variables to the estimations in Table 3. The asterisks ***,
**, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers
in parentheses are robust standard errors. In particular, in the “Two-Step” estimations,
Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors are provided. The estimation results are
similar to those of Table 3. “p =” is the p-value of a statistical test. The Hansen tests of
over-identifying restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions at the conventional
significance level for all estimations. We test whether the diﬀerenced error terms are serially
correlated with respect to the second order. The p-values are so large that the AR(2) tests
do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation.
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Growth 535 0.0161 0.0323 -0.2236 0.1026
Logarithm of initial GDP per capita 534 7.8843 1.5692 4.4392 10.6120
Financial Openness 523 0.4558 1.5673 -1.8312 2.5000
Corruption 534 2.8609 1.3063 0 6
Education 555 7.1031 2.7592 0.4849 13.0221
Private Credit 518 0.4875 0.4368 0.0040 2.3356
Investment 545 0.2236 0.0807 -0.0226 0.5478
Trade 534 0.7881 0.4798 0.1342 4.2363
Inflation 526 0.5732 3.8438 -0.1910 64.2499
Population Growth 555 0.0145 0.0159 -0.2036 0.1140
Government Expenditure 540 0.1551 0.0568 0.0408 0.4806
Life Expectancy 555 68.0593 9.6858 38.9262 82.3354
Notes: These statistics are calculated based on five-year averaged data of 111 countries listed
in Table A1 in Appendix A.2.
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